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Comments
Women and Credit
"The human species, according to the best theory I can form of it, is
composed of two distinct races, the men who borrow, and the men who
lend."'
. Credit is a necessity of life, not only to men but to women. Regardless
of credit worth, single, married, separated, divorced or widowed women
either are denied credit or are subject to a higher standard of credit
worth than their male counterparts in the major consumer credit
transactions. This differential treatment is reflected in the procedures
and attitudes used by lenders in the evaluation of the credit risk.
Economic justifications for the different behavior are statistically re-
futed. What remains as the source of the discrimination is a centuries-
old belief as to the status of women. The consequences of this unjustified
denial of credit include restraints on relocation, impediments to educa-
tional and employment opportunities for oneself and children and
inadequate retirement provisions.
The purpose of this comment is to demonstrate that sex and/or
marital status discrimination in the credit transaction is rooted in
unsound economic and social assumptions regarding women. Remedial
solutions which yield economic opportunity for credit combine en-
forcement of federal and state legislation with a restructured adminis-
trative policy and self help procedures. Equal credit opportunities will
be available once society ceases assigning economic and social roles on
the arbitrary basis of sex and marital status.
I. CREDIT RISK ANALYSIS
The fundamental element in the economic survival of both lenders
and borrowers is the credit risk. An evaluation of credit risk is to be
made more in terms of the realities of the market place than in terms
of abstract, economic theorems. Everyday credit risk decisions reflect a
business judgment of the nation's economic health and of the frequency
of credit difficulties. When the economic and social costs and benefits
of increasing or decreasing credit risk are balanced against each other,
1. C. LAMB, THE Two RACES OF MEN, AN ESSAY 1820 (1823).
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a sound business judgment of credit worth can be made. 2 If the deter-
mination of credit risk includes non-risk factors, the business assessment
becomes distorted.
Credit risk analysis has traditionally been a function of three ele-
ments: character, capacity and collateral. 3 The individual's desire to
pay (character), his ability to pay (capacity), and his financial strength
(collateral) are judged in the framework of economic and social con-
ditions of the risk's environment. 4 A modem analyst measures prospec-
tive credit risk by identifying borrower characteristics related to actual
credit collection difficulties in the past and by assessing the status of
these characteristics in the present credit structure.5 When the credit
risk is measured within the framework of statistics, the traditionally
subjective determinations of credit evaluators can be minimized. The
factoring in of sex and marital status into the credit risk decision will
be shown to be an invalid predictor of prospective credit worth.
A. Credit Cards and Small Loans
The point system is the most common method of analyzing credit
information. Its purpose is to filter out the worst credit risks. Points are
given for marital status, profession, terms of employment, and bonus
2. E. FIELDLER, MEASURES OF CREDIT RISK AND EXPERIENCE, NATIONAL BuREAu OF Eco-
NOMIC RESEARCH 10-11 (1971) [hereinafter cited as FIELDLER].
3. T. BECKMAN & R. BARTEIS-, CREDITS AND COLLECTIONS IN THEORY AND PRACTICE (6th ed.
1955).
4. Character is the combination of mental and moral qualities which prompt the
debtor to want or intend to pay when a debt is due. Honesty, integrity and responsibility
are among the qualities of character. Evidence of character is a long and consistent record
of debt payment, length of time at residence or employment, educational development and
positions of trust which an individual may hold in business or social organizations. Char-
acter is often the most significant factor particularly in consumer credit dealings because
capital has little weight when consumers borrow on their signatures. Id. at 53-64.
Capacity relates to the ability to pay. Although the most significant factor is earning
power, expenditure pattern and length of credit obligation are also important. Evidence of
capacity includes income which is related to the individual's health, education, occupation
and age. Id. at 55-56.
Collateral is financial strength of the individual in terms of what the creditor may
seize as payment for the debt. Evidence of a consumer's collateral includes household goods,
bank accounts or real estate. Credit will not be extended solely upon the basis of collateral
for the creditor contemplates a continuous relationship with the consumer. Furthermore,
several states have laws exempting certain personal property from seizure. Id. at 56-57.
Whereas character, capacity and collateral relate to the individual's credit worth, a
creditor's sound business judgment is often made in the frame of reference of economic,
political and social conditions of the risk's environment. Id. at 57.
5. FIELELR, supra note 2.
6. A typical scoring sheet of a major finance company provided 15 points if the ap-
plicant had been employed on the same job for 8-14 years but only 3 points if employed
on the same job for 1-5 years. This rule of thumb results in discrimination against those
who change employment for financially beneficial reasons bearing no relation to stability
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of income. Hearings on the Availability of Credit to Women, Before the National Com-
mission on Consumer Finance, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972) [hereinafter cited as Consumer
Credit]. The following form is a typical credit point form:
DIRECTIONS: Circle the number in each row that most closely describes you. Record
the number in the Code Box column. Total the Code Box column, adding in the Bonus
Points. A score of 20 points or more? Send todayl
Sample Line
21-25 36-452
46-65 65 &over2 1 1 1
Age
21-25 26-35 j136 -45 46-65 65&over
Marital Status
single separated divorced widowed1 1married
Dependents (including yourself)
one two three four five or more
Living Facilities
with parents rent: furn. rent: unfurn. own, mtg. own, no mtg.
1 1 1 -2 4 5
Years at Present Address
under 1 yr. 1-2 yrs. 3-5 yrs. 6-10 yrs. over 10 yrs.
1 1 1 2 2
Years at Previous Address
under 1 yr. 1-2 yrs. 3-5 yrs. 6-10 yrs. over 10
1 1 1 1 1 2 2
Total Monthly Income
under $400 $401-600 $601-800 $801-1000 over 1000
Years with Present Employer
under 1 yr. 1-3 yrs. 46yrs. 7-10 yrs. oer 10 yrs.
Total Monthly Obligations
under$75 $75-125 $126-200 $201-300 over $300
Occupation
part time unskilled skilled lexecor super. profess.
Bonus points (Circle all that apply)
CodeBox
L
I I
L
I I
I I
ELI
TotalEL1
865
I phne in I lan exp. lan exp. checking lyour name at this bank at other bank at this bank2 5 3 i 2 I
I phone in 
Ica x 
0' " -
ch in
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points for telephone in the head of the household's name, customarily
the husband's name.
Discrimination on the basis of sex surfaces when the credit grantor
says that he assigns fewer points to women than married men because
women earn less than men. The justification is specious because points
have already been assessed to her income.7 This differential treatment
intensifies when the single woman is told that she must meet higher
standards than male applicants for bank sponsored credit cards in
terms of employment, time at present residence and minimum salary.
Marital status discrimination is highlighted when a woman's changed
marital status simultaneously shifts her credit status to the risk category.
When a newly married woman, with a prior good credit record, notifies
the credit card institution to reissue her card with her husband's sur-
name, she generally must reapply, submitting financial information
about her husband, for the wife is now considered a dependent. Her
husband's present employment and prior credit references are the
principal credit criteria in the analysis of her credit worth. If she does
not supply the requested information, the wife is evaluated as a new
applicant with no prior credit record, despite her good credit record
as a single woman. If she qualifies for a credit card, it is standard prac-
tice to issue the card in the husband's name or to the wife, using the
husband's first and last name. The married woman surrenders her
credit identity because more than one wife could exist. However, use
of her own first name and her husband's surname would preserve her
individuality.
Her credit identity problems are compounded when the local credit
bureau files information on the wife under the husband's name. She
builds no credit standing even though her earnings constituted the
family's income. That good credit record established in the husband's
name remains with the husband. Even if the wife has regularly paid her
debts, her husband's credit delinquency record becomes her credit
record. Unfortunately, when she is most in need of a good credit
identity, such as unexpected death or enormous medical expenses, she
is least likely to obtain credit because she lacks a credit identity.
In addition to the lack of a credit identity, newly separated and
divorced women generally must wait six to twelve months before their
credit applications will be considered. Creditors support this marital
7. Littlefield, Sex-based Discrimination and Credit Granting Practices, 5 CONN. L. REv.
578 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Littlefield].
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status discrimination by arguing that a sudden change in marital status
creates temporary unreliability. The automatic caveat that the newly
separated or divorced man would be treated similarly breaks down for
a man has no duty to notify the creditor of a changed marital status.
His name remains unchanged and his prior credit record survives the
dissolved marriage. Another obstacle facing the divorcee is that the
divorce settlement of alimony and support payments is considered an
unstable source of income and seldom counted as valid income. If the
estranged husband is dependable, an otherwise creditworthy divorcee
is denied the credit because this source of income is automatically
invalidated."
The widow soon learns that it is easier to continue a deceased hus-
band's charge account for she is treated as a new applicant upon an
attempt to change the account to her own name.
In transactions involving credit cards and loans, a woman must sub-
mit superior credentials to qualify for bank sponsored credit cards.
Once a woman marries, she surrenders her credit reputation when she
assumes her husband's name. Any subsequent dealings denominate
credit worth to the family unit, identified by the husband's name.
Upon a change in marital status, whether it be death, divorce or
separation, the woman can not obtain credit for she has no credit record
upon which a business judgment can be rendered. A modest proposal
is that a woman's credit worth be assessed in terms of her individual
qualifications.
B. Home Mortgage Financing
The pattern of discrimination on the basis of sex and marital status
in home mortgage financing is traced in the economic and social justi-
fications submitted by the potential mortgagees or home loan insurance
agents. The economic facts distinguishing women as a socioeconomic
class are founded upon basic assumptions concerning income potential,
pregnancy and employment continuity. The inferior legal status of
women is defined as the social justification for the different credit
treatment. Once the discrimination is illustrated, the question becomes
8. See generally A. LOTMAN, CREDIT REPORT, PENNSYLVANIA COMMISSION ON THE STATUS
OF WOMEN (1973); Consumer Credit, supra note 6, at 5-6. Both of these organizations have
been invaluable sources of information and their reports reflect astute analyses of the
credit problem.
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whether there exists in the present credit structure a significant correla-
tion between sex and marital status and credit worth.
1. The Married Woman
When a married woman applies with her husband for a home mort-
gage, the couple is informed that the working wife's income is to be dis-
counted by 50 per cent or not counted at all. Lenders place great
weight on the income of the loan applicant because they believe that
the percentage of income devoted to housing expense is an important
factor in the assessment of the credit risk. The amount of family income
is seen to be in direct proportion to the amount lenders are willing to
extend. When the working wife's income is not counted 100 per cent
the maximum amount of loan eligibility diminishes.9
a. Commercial Lenders °
Commercial lenders refuse to count the working wife's income 100
per cent when computing the family's effective income. 1 A nonprofes-
sional working wife's income is discounted even more than a profes-
sional.12
9. See Comment, Discrimination Against Women in Home Mortgage Financing, 3
YALE J.L. & Soc. AcrIoN 186 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Discrimination].
10. Where public or private mortgage insurance is not available, the lender requires a
down payment of at least 25 per cent of the cost of the home so that his risk is minimized.
If mortgage insurance is provided, the down payment may be less than 10 per cent because
the insurer assumes the risk. Because the type of mortgage has a low loan to value ratio,
the loan being almost equal to the value of the home and property, default is more fre-
quent than mortgages with a large down payment. Note, Mortgage and Consumer Credit,
1 WOMEN'S LAw RE'. 25, 28 (1973).
11. A recent survey supporting this conclusion is the May, 1972 study of the savings
and loan industry by the United States Savings and Loan League. Of the 400 savings and
loan companies surveyed, 28 per cent would give full credit to a working wife's income,
and 14 per cent would count the income more than 50 per cent. The no-response rate was
21 per cent which was significant because all other questions in the survey had a 1 per
cent or less no-response rate. Discrimination, supra note 9.
Another survey underscoring the practice of income discounting is the Federal Home
Loan Bank Board Survey of 100 savings and loan associations in 1971. Twenty-five per cent
of the mortgage lenders refused to count a working wife's income at all if she were 25
years old, had two school age children and worked full time as a secretary. Sixty-three per
cent said they would count 50 per cent or less of her income. Only 22 per cent would
allow full credit. The Bank Board de-emphasized the significance of these results by noting
that only 74 institutions responded and that the selection process used no method of
scientific sampling. Discrimination, supra note 9, at 168 n.18. Viewed another way the
survey probably understates the extent of discrimination. The 100 institutions were se-
lected as those most likely to cooperate. Also, the 74 respondents demonstrated liberal
lending policies to families in the low income or minority groups. Yet 68 per cent of the
responding associations would not give full credit to the full time working wife's income
despite their liberal lending practices. Consumer Credit, supra note 6, at 5-6 (testimony of
S. Rohde, Center for National Policy Review, Catholic University School of Law).
12. In a survey of the mortgage lending practices in the District of Columbia area,
the District of Columbia Advisory Commission on the Status of Women and the Women's
Legal Defense Fund found that even though all 40 lenders surveyed viewed current sal-
868
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b. The Veteran's Administration (VA) 13
The married couple seeking to secure a VA guarantee combine their
individual incomes as their effective gross income. The VA guidelines
provide that a working wife's income must be discounted because she
is not considered a valid, reliable source of long term income. A lender
may count her "net income," gross income minus child care expenses,
when the wife is beyond childbearing age, the threshold year being 38,
and has established a precedent of returning to her employment after
pregnancy.1 4
A lender's interpretation of the VA guidelines is as multifarious as
the techniques used to convince the VA that a wife's income is reliable.
Often lenders will not count the wife's salary except to offset short
term personal obligations. Other lenders require a baby letter, a state-
ment of the wife and her pediatrician that she is on a program of birth
control with no plans of pregnancy.15 One couple was required to sign
affidavits agreeing to abortion if their method of birth control should
fail. The VA infrequently guarantees a mortgage loan for the woman
veteran unless she has a husband with earnings to cover the debt.,
These credit standards reflect the vagueness of the VA's requirement
that a steady pattern of past employment and the probability of future
work be demonstrated.1 7
c. The Federal Housing Administration (FHA)18
Although the FHA has never had specific procedures applicable to
female applicants, it has always had criteria assessing the reliability of
aries as a valid source of income for men and women, only 27 (66.5 per cent) would not
discount the income if the working wife were a professional and only 3 (32.5 per cent)
would not discount the wife's income if she were a nonprofessional. The response rate
was low. Hearings on the Economic Problems of Women Before the Joint Economic Com-
mittee, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 3, at 531 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Economic Problems]
(testimony of Mary Dublin Keverling, Chairman of D.C. Comm'n on the Status of Women).
13. The VA, 38 U.S.C. §§ 201-44 (1970), is an independent agency in the executive
branch of government. Part of its wide program of veterans' benefits is its home insurance
under id. § 1910.
14. Economic Problems, supra note 12, at 532-33.
15. Complaints have been made that the "baby letter" is an unconscionable invasion
of privacy. Id. at 548.
16. Search for a Mortgage Loan, in WOMEN AND CRxrr, NATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR
WOMEN (1972).
17. On July 19, 1973, the VA approved an Information Bulletin wherein it stated that
the VA will recognize fully the income and expenses of the veteran and his or her spouse
in its determination of the ability to repay a loan. The VA regional officers were instructed
that income was not to be discounted on the basis of sex and/or marital status. Unless a
data collection system is created to determine if the criteria are followed, the loan officials
may continue to say "age and sex" not "income" are the proper credit standards. Economic
Problems, supra note 12, at 551 (testimony of Hon. Frankie Freeman, Member of United
States Comm'n on Civil Rights).
18. The FHA, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1702-15 (1970), is now under the auspices of the Department
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the working wife's income. Before 1965, the practice had been not to
count her income in support of the mortgage because of the assumption
that the wife would quit work permanently upon her first pregnancy.
The FHA policy since 1965 is that no source of income should
arbitrarily be excluded; however, either all of the working wife's in-
come or none of it is counted.19 Before a young working wife obtains
approval to use her income as part of the "effective income" she has
the burden of proof that she has established a stable source of income
and definitely plans to continue employment. With regard to the
pregnancy possibility, the FHA manual 20 states that since employers
frequently provide maternity leave,, a woman with "strong motives"
for returning to work who fails to do so "would represent such a very
small percentage of volume that it could be accepted as a calculated
risk.'21 The "strong motive" standard is vague and the danger of
various interpretations could be curbed by more specific FHA guide-
lines.
2. The Minority Woman
Since lenders have strict maximum limits on the ratio of mortgage
payments to effective income, the inclusion of a wife's income, or other
valid sources of income could be the marginal difference in purchasing
power needed to qualify for a mortgage. The practice of income dis-
counting is especially oppressive to minority families where it is more
common for both partners to work.22 The wife's income could make the
difference between poverty and an acceptable living standard for the
exclusion of her income would effectively shut the family out of the
new home market.
of Housing and Urban Development. The FHA insures mortgages with low down payments
and longer periods of maturity than are available with conventional loan institutions. A
FHA insured loan can not exceed $33,000.
19. The FHA's policy change is indicative of the recognition of the stability of a work-
ing wife's employment. FHA statistics show that in 1964, 27 per cent of insured cases had
working wives; in 1970, the number rose to 44 per cent. In 1964, the FHA counted the
wife's income in 73 per cent of the cases; in 1970, her income was counted 89 per cent of
the cases where the loan application was approved. The FHA has not analyzed reasons
for loan application rejection. A greater degree of discrimination could exist for those
rejected could be those instances where the FHA had failed to include the young working
wife's income.
20. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT, MORTGAGE CREDIT
ANALYSIS HANDBOOK FOR MORTGAGE INSURANCE ON ONE TO FOUR FAMILY PROPERTIES (1972).
21. Id. § 22b.
22. Fifty-one per cent of nonwhite wives and 40.5 per cent of white wives participate
in the labor force. In the 1970 Census, those of Spanish origin comprised 26 per cent of
the white race. Negroes comprised 89 per cent of the nonwhite races. UNITED STATES DE-
PARTMENT OF LABOR, WORKING WOMEN, WOMEN'S BUtRAU OF EMPLOYMENT STANDARDS ADMIN.
4 (rev. 1973) [hereinafter cited as WORKING WOMEN].
870
Vol. 12: 863, 1974
Comments
3. The Single Woman
When a woman applies individually for a mortgage loan, she often
encounters marital status discrimination whether she is single, sepa-
rated, divorced or widowed. 28 The discrimination is reflected in the
attitude that a married mortgagor is more stable than one who is single
because responsibilities tie the married mortgagor to his obligations.
24
Since more women than men comprise these categories,25 the mari-
tal status discrimination inflicts greater harm to the woman, particu-
larly the black woman. 26 Even if the income of divorced and separated
women is regarded as stable, lenders often refuse arbitrarily to count
alimony and child support as reliable sources of income. On the other
hand, current earnings, retirement and disability payments are con-
sidered valid sources of income.27 Economic reliability and stability,
not sex and marital status, are the keys to the credit risk decision.
C. Economic and Social Justifications for the Credit Practices
1. The Economic Negatives
a. Loss of Creditworthy Customers-the Married Woman
Practices used in mortgage financing are founded upon certain as-
sumptions concerning the reliability of a woman's income. When a
woman marries, the possibility of uncontrolled pregnancy is presumed
as well as automatic and perpetual employment termination upon
having a child. Lenders argue that her income is temporary and the
absence of her income would significantly impair the family's ability
to continue the mortgage obligation. These business hypotheses lack
economic verification for two reasons: the small likelihood of the work-
ing wife's income terminating in the early years of the mortgage, which
23. The Federal Home Loan Bank Board survey, supra note 11, concluded that 64
per cent of the savings and loan associations surveyed used marital status as a factor in
evaluating the loan application.
24. See supra note 20, § 2-7(a):
The mortgagor who is married and has a family generally evidences more stability
than a mortgagor who is single because, among other things, he has responsibilities
holding him to his obligations.
Noteworthy is that single men also experience the discrimination; however, analysis of that
problem is beyond the scope of this comment.
25. The 1970 Census Report stated that 14V million women are separated, divorced
and widowed whereas only 5 million men fit those categories. UNrTED STATES BUREAU OF
THE CENSUS, CENSUS OF POPULATION: 1970, GENERAL POPULATION CHARACTERISTICS, FINAL
REPORT PC (1)-BI UNITED STATES SUMMARY, TABLE 54: HOUSEHOLD AND FAMILY CHARACrER-
ISTICS By RACE AND SIZE OF PLACE 1-278 (1970).
26. A higher proportion of black women as compared with white women are separated,
widowed and divorced and must support themselves. Id.
27. Economic Problems, supra note 12, at 539-40.
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are the critical years; and the probability that delinquency or default
is not a function of the amount of income devoted to housing expenses.
(i) Employment Continuity
Lenders often classify income of the woman who marries as tempo-
rary because of assumed high quit rates and uncontrolled pregnancies.
Their attitudes fail to account for the variables which determine a
working wife's labor status: family child care needs, if any, economic
necessity and desire to remain in the work force. With regard to marital
status, of the 44 per cent of the female population in the labor force
in 1972,28 41 per cent of the working women were married and lived
with their husbands.29 Forty-one per cent of the married women be-
tween the ages of 25 and 34, the primary childbearing years, worked.30
Furthermore, in 1969, 66 per cent of the childless wives between the
ages of 25 and 34 participated in the labor force. At 30, a working wife
with no children has a worilife expectancy of 27 years.81 A change
in marital status does not cause immediate employment termination.
The next assumption challenged is that pregnancy is a significant
factor in job continuity. One half of all wives living with their
husbands with children between the ages of 6 and 17, and two thirds of
the separated, divorced or widowed women with school aged children,
are employed. The worklife expectancy of a 35 year old woman who
has returned to the labor force is 24 years. Twenty-nine per cent of the
married women with pre-school children and one half of the sepa-
rated, widowed or divorced women are in the labor force. 2 Married
women do return as permanent members of the work force.
Even though women become pregnant and do leave the work force,
28. Id. at 6. Of the 43 million women not in the labor force, 36 million kept house,
4 million were students and 3 million were not members for health reasons. WORKING
WOMEN, supra note 22, at 4.
29. Participation in the labor force according to marital status ranges from 27 per cent
of widows to 41 per cent of the married women with the husband present, 55 per cent of
the single women and 62 of divorced or separated women. WORKING WOMEN, supra note 22,
at 2.
30. Labor force participation rate of women by age and marital status in 1972:
Under 65 and
Total 20 20-24 25-34 35-44 45-64 older
Single 54.9 41.9 69.9 84.7 71.5 71.0 19.0
Married women
. husband present 41.5 39.0 48.5 41.3 48.6 44.2 7.3
Widowed, divorced
separated 40.1 44.6 57.6 62.1 71.7 61.1 9.8
Economic Problems, supra note 12, at 6.
31. Id.
32. WORKING WOMEN, supra note 22, at 2.
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the crucial question is how many wives will quit work and refuse to
return to work if by quitting they will default on their mortgage pay-
ments with the consequent foreclosure? An inquiry must be made into
the credit experience concerning the stability of the wife's income and
the availability of maternity leave provisions. The 1964 study by the
United States Savings and Loan League 5 reveals that loans to families
where the husband's salary accounted for 100 per cent of the family
income had a higher likelihood of being delinquent than loans to
families where the husband's income was only a portion of the family
income.3 4 Suspicions about the woman's creditworthiness are calmed
by studies which find that women are better risks than men 3 5 the
probability of bad accounts for single and married women being sub-
stantially lower than for men with the same marital status.36
Certain federal laws,37 state laws38 and many union plans3 9 provide
for maternity benefits with job security. A few state statutes require
33. L. KENDALL, ANATOMY OF THE RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGE, UNITED STATES SAVINGS AND
LOAN LEAGUE (1964). The study failed to control other factors which might relate to
delinquency.
34. Id.
35. D. DURAND, RISK ELEMENTS IN CONSUMER INSTALLMENT FINANCING 74 (1941) [herein-
after cited as DURANDI.
36. Smith, Measuring Risk on Installment Credit, in MANAGEMENT SCIENCE 327-40
(1964).
37. Women employees in the railroad industry are given the right to use their regular
sick benefits during absences for pregnancy or childbirth. Federally employed women do
not receive as maternity leave as such but paid sick leave is available. 5 U.S.C. §§ 6301-11'
(1970). A regulation promulgated by the Civil Service Commission permits sick leave to
be used as maternity leave. The annual number of sick days can be accumulated. Job
security is guaranteed to women granted maternity leave. Furthermore, government em-
ployees may participate in one of the health insurance plans which include payments
toward maternity medical care for the women employees. Id. §§ 8901-13.
Exec. Order No. 11375, 3 C.F.R. 684 (1971), precludes discrimination on the basis of sex
by federal contractors and subcontractors and by federally assisted construction contractors
and subcontractors. Guidelines relating to maternity leave are being prepared.
In private industry, women employees are protected by rulings from the Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity (EEOC), which administers Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-e15 (1970). Employers must grant recall rights to women after childbirth
as they would grant to men after an extended illness. Also, a leave of absence should. be
granted for pregnancy whether or not it is granted for illness. The EEOC has ruled that
the employer can decide when the pregnant woman must leave her work and paid sick
leave but unpaid maternity leave does not violate the act. See Littlefield, supra note 7,
at 586-88.
38. New Jersey, Rhode Island and Puerto Rico provide cash benefits for maternity
leave. Of the six states and Puerto Rico that prohibit employment for periods before and
after childbirth, only Puerto Rico gives women reemployment rights or compensation.
Thirty-seven states and the District of Columbia disallow collection of unemployment
benefits during the period before and after childbirth, even if the employment termination
was due to a layoff. State and local governments often allow women employees to use sick
leave as maternity leave; some also have insured medical leave. See Littlefield, supra note
7, at 588.
39. Voluntary health plans embrace union negotiated insurance plans and programs
offered by commercial insurance companies, associations of hospitals or physicians, and
group cooperatives. Id. at 587-88.
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that women workers in certain industries and occupations take a mater-
nity leave; 40 however, the validity of these statutes under Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964,41 or their constitutionality under the
equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment or the proposed
equal rights amendment is questionable.42 The most obvious point is
that the male may also leave the labor force due to sustained illnesses
or medical conditions.
Advocates of equality of consideration for credit extension can suc-
cessfully rebut the argument that pregnancy interferes with a woman's
ability to produce income. Women are in the labor force and return to
the labor force after pregnancy. Their credit worth does not depreciate
because of their marital status. Finally, if maternity benefits or job
security are not available, intelligent financial planning can insure that
the income void during that time will not be too great.
(ii) Housing Expense to Income Ratio
Lenders have traditionally believed that the amount of family in-
come allocated to housing is an important factor in determining a
credit risk.43 The ratio of expenses to income is usually between 20-25
per cent so that an applicant with an income of $10,000 would be eli-
gible for a loan yielding total annual payments of $2000-2500. Since
26.2 per cent of the average working couple's income is attributed to
the working wife,44 the issue becomes whether, upon the wife's leaving
the work force, the absence of her income converts the mortgage loan
into a credit risk.
The risk probability of a loan relying upon a wife's income for sup-
port was analyzed by John Herzog and James Earley for the National
Bureau of Economic Research.45 Their conclusion was that significant
risk factors were the percentage of the borrower's equity in the pur-
chase, the existence of junior financing and the purpose of the loan.46
The expense to income ratio was not statistically significant in deter-
40. These states are Connecticut, Massachusetts, Missouri, New York, Vermont, Washing-
ton and Puerto Rico. See UNrrED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, HANDBOOK ON WOMEN
WoRKas 276-77 (1969).
41. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-e15 (1970).
42. See Brown, Emerson, Falk & Freedman, The Equal Rights Amendment: A Con-
stitutional Basis for Equal Rights for Women, 80 YALE L.J. 871, 929-32 (1971).
43. See textual material relating to note 9 supra.
44. CONSUMER CarErr, -supra note 6, at 9 (testimony of J. McElhorne, Economist Fed-
eral Home Loan Bank Board).
45. J. HERzoG & J. EA=Y, HOME MORTGACE DELINQUENCY AND FORECLOSURE (1970)
[hereinafter cited as HEszoc & EARLEY].
46. Id. at 50-52, 54, 58-60, 62-63.
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mining delinquency and foreclosure risk.47 The only significant bor-
rower characteristic was occupation with professional persons, execu-
tives and managers, being the least delinquent, and self-employed
persons and salesmen as the most delinquent. 48 The author of studies
of FHA and VA insured loans, George von Furstenberg, agrees that
as the loan to value ratio rises, it becomes an increasingly more impor-
tant indicator of default risk in mortgage loans.49 Earlier studies also
discount the expense to income ratio as a predictor of mortgage de-
fault.50 Consequently, to the degree that the expense to income ratio
is not predictive of risk, lenders who use it in credit risk analysis lack
an adequate justification for discounting the working wife's income.
b. Loss of Creditworthy Customers-the Single Woman
The poor risk status of the single woman is founded upon a belief
that she is inherently unstable and incapable of handling her own
affairs. The single woman has been denominated as less responsible on
her obligations than a married man, and she is likely to change her
marital status which triggers the uncontrolled pregnancy which re-
sults in permanent job termination. The validity of these assumptions
is doubtful.
47. Herzog and Earley point out that the lenders could have controlled this aspect of
the credit risk by the use of the 20-25 per cent rule. Yet, the results of the study show
that the expense to income ratio did not pass the significance test at the 1 per cent or
5 per cent levels. Id. at 54; Discrimination, supra note 9, at 171 n.45.
48. See HEaZOG & EARLEY, supra note 45, at 54.
49. G. voN FURSErNBERG, TEcHNIcAL STUDIES OF MORTGAGE DEFAULT RIS: AN ANALYSIS
oF THE EXPERIENE wxTt FHA AND VA HOME LOANS DURING THE DECADE 1957-66 (1971).
50. In 1964, the study by the United States Savings and Loan League, supra note 33,
concluded that the significant risk characteristics were high loan to value ratios and a
borrower with many dependents.
A 1963 FHA study concluded that the credit risk is lessened when the loan to value
ratio is low. The risk predictors included the age of loans, amount of down payment and
term of loans. The study did not analyze the borrower as a factor in the determination of
credit risk. HOUSING AND HOME FIN. AGENCY, FHA EXPERIENCE WITH MORTGAGE FORECLosURES
AND PROPERTY AcqUIsirIoNs (1963).
A 1962 VA study of VA guaranteed loans in default as of December 31, 1960, and all
new defaults in the first quarter of 1961; found the risk factors to be the loan to value
ratio and the long term of maturity. Defaults decreased as borrower's equity increased.
VETERANS ADMINISTRATION REPORT, LOAN SERvICE AND CLAIMS STUDY (1962).
Whereas the United States Savings and Loan League looked to the causes of delinquency
and ignored foreclosure, the FHA and VA studies used foreclosure as the risk indicator
with no analysis of the factors relevant to default.
The Herzog and Earley study of the determinants of credit difficulties in home mortgage
loans is the most reliable study to analyze the validity of the economic justifications for
discounting a working wife's income. The. sample used included good and bad loans made
by the VA, FHA and conventional mortgage lenders. Herzog and Earley applied multiple
regression analyses. From the regression results, risk indexes were constructed based on the
several risk-related characteristics for which time series credit risk data was available.
See FxLDLzR, supra note 2, at 33.
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Not only is the credit reliability of women higher than men, 1
marital status is not significantly relevant to delinquency and fore-
closure risk.5 2 The conclusion that single women have less responsi-
bility with regard to their obligations can not be supported.
Single women who remain single have a 45 year worklife expectancy,
which is longer than the average male.5a If she remains single, the
single woman's income remains as stable as the income of a married
man.
If the single woman does marry, the change in marital status is not
the sine qua non of income depletion and consequent loan risk cate-
gorization. If the couple chooses to move, the property can be sold or
rented. If the home is used as the family residence, it will often be
converted into a joint tenancy with the husband and wife assuming
joint liability on the promissory note. The wife's choice to remain in
the labor force results in a combined income from which the payments
will be made. Even if the wife were to quit her employment, the hus-
band's income, often higher and regularly incremented, should be
adequate to continue regular payments.
The justifications for the differential treatment of single women are
economically unsound and are reminiscent of the myth that a woman
needs the protection of a man.
c. Loss of Purchasers in the Secondary Mortgage Market
The aforementioned business practices may result in an economic
negative in the secondary mortgage market. In order to facilitate the
flow of funds for additional residential financing, government spon-
sored corporations, the Federal National Mortgage Association54
(FNMA) and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation 55
(FHLMC) have been created to purchase mortgages from mortgagees. 56
51. DURAND, supra note 35, at 74-5.
52. HERzoG & EARtLEY, supra note 45, at 58, 59-60, 62.
53. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, MANPOWER ADMINISTRATION, WORK LIFm Ex-
PECTANCY AND TRAINING NEEDS OF WOMEN, MANPOWER REORT No. 12 (May 1967).
54. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1716-23 (1970). The FNMA, "Fannie Mae," is a government-sponsored
"private" corporation regulated by the Secretary of the Department of Housing and Urban
Development. FNMA provides a secondary mortgage market for FHA and VA insured
mortgages, id. § 1717(b)(1), and since 1972, for conventional (non-FHA and VA) mortgages.
Id. § 1717(b)(2). See Note, Mortgage and Consumer Credit, 1 WOMEN's LAw PLEP. 25, 28
(1973).
55. 12 U.S.C. §t 1451-59 (1970). Its Board of Directors is composed of the members of
the Federal Home Loan Bank Board. Id. § 1452. FHLMC, "Freddie Mac," buys mortgages
originated by federal savings and loan associations, federal home loan banks, and state
charted banks that are members of the Federal Home Loan Bank System. Id.
56. Life insurance companies are often the only private industry which buys and sells
mortgages. Id.
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Whereas the credit practices by the VA and FHA insured mort-
gagees are limited by guidelines issued by the insuring agencies, the
credit practices of conventional mortgagees are controlled by the mort-
gage seller's warranties in the conventional selling contract with the
FNMA. The FNMA contract carries a warranty of nondiscrimination
by sex although it fails to mention marital status discrimination. 57 The
contract requires the potential seller to make a "reasonable" credit
determination of the probability that a two income family will have
sufficient income in the future to liquidate the debt. 8 In contrast with
the FNMA, the FHLMC has more positive credit guidelines in that
they specify that a lender's reasonable determination should include
both incomes in at least 20 per cent of the cases.59 If part time work can
be expected to remain stable for three years, the income is to be
counted.60 The guidelines emphasize that the possibility of temporary
leave, such as maternity leave, is no reason to discount any part of the
applicant's income.61
Changes in mortgage financing practices are economically mandated
if potential sellers are to participate in the secondary mortgage market.
Provided these guidelines are enforced, the potential mortgage seller
whose underwriting policy is the inclusion of the working wife's income
has a reliable purchaser of the mortgage. The economic soundness of
existing credit practices has been further undermined by the fore-
closure of purchasers in the secondary mortgage market.
Economically, sex and marital discrimination in the grant or denial
of credit is an unsound business practice. Not only may potential
customers be foreclosed, but significant purchasers of conventional
57. The warranty is:
Seller had not discriminated against the mortgagor in the fixing of the amount,
interest rate, duration, or the terms or conditions of the loan, because of the race,
color . . . sex, age . . . of the mortgagor and will not discriminate against the mort-
gagor in the servicing of the mortgage, because of the race, color . . . sex, age . . .
of the mortgagor.
Conventional Selling Contract, FNMA Form 1002, § 701(s), CCH FED. BANKING L. REP.
25,764 (1972).
58. Section 311. Credit and Property Underwriting.
(c) Income in the Case of More than One Mortgagor. In the case of joint title to the
property, the effective income of each mortgagor is computed separately then added
together to provide a sum for total effective income. The key determination to be made
is whether the circumstances reasonably indicate that the income, jointly or severally,
will continue in a manner sufficient to liquidate the debt under the terms of the note
and mortgage.
Id. 25,733.
59. Economic Problems, supra note 12, at 199 (testimony of W. Taylor, Director of the
Center for National Policy Review, Catholic University School of Law).
60. Discrimination, supra note 9, at 170.
61. Id.
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mortgages may refuse to deal with potential mortgage sellers. Since
"sound business practice" does not compel these business practices, the
reason may lie in the opinion that a woman can not be held legally
liable for her debts. Is sex and marital status discrimination "as much
a traditional vein of American society as racial bigotry, and its roots
probably run insidiously deeper?"62
2. The Social Justification for Credit Practices
The social justification for credit practices is that a woman's legal
status is inferior to a man's. Misunderstood concepts of property and
domestic relations laws yield this belief.
The common law doctrine of "necessaries" permits a creditor to hold
the husband liable for the debts incurred by the wife for her support.
If the wife's obligation is construed as support, the creditor demands
information concerning the financial stability of the husband who will
be ultimately liable if the wife is irresponsible. When the wife's debt
is not support, the husband's cosignature is nevertheless required as a
form of insurance. Unless both owners have cosigned, the creditor can
not levy upon the property acquired during marriage and held in
tenancy by the entireties. Creditors understandably hesitate to relin-
quish the opportunity to seek the husband's assets for payment of the
wife's debts.6
Creditors have voiced the fear that the husband's common law duty
of support will provide the vehicle by which the wife can avoid her
contractual obligations. The legal duty of support for the wife's "neces-
saries" can not be waived by either partner. When these rules of domes-
tic relations law are qualified by family expense statutes and judicial
construction of "necessaries," the creditor's dilemma is substantially
eliminated.
Family expense statutes provide that both the husband and wife's
property are liable for the expenses of the family. The apparent con-
flict arises as to the wife's responsibility for those obligations with the
scope of the husband's duty of support and the family expense statutes.
Creditors believe that, despite the wife's credit worth, the husband is
ultimately liable for debts construed to be part of her support. In some
states, the husband remains liable for the support of the wife and
62. Murphy, A Study of the Equal Pay Act, 1963-1970, 39 U. CIN. L. REv. 615 (1970).
63. Hoffmann, Sex in the Money Market, 2 MARYLAND L.F. 135 (1972) [hereinafter cited
as Hoffmann].
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children, but the wife is not relieved of her obligations. If the obliga-
tion is within the husband's duty of support, the wife is guaranteed a
right of indemnification by the husband for payment of those expenses
incurred on behalf of the family. Furthermore, since "necessaries" are
only a part of the expenses within the purview of the family expense
statutes, the wife remains solely liable for obligations which are not
"necessaries." Consequently, creditors need only be concerned with the
wife's financial stability and information pertinent to her husband's
financial status is irrelevant in assessing her credit worth.
In the 27 states without family expense statutes, the creditor's justi-
fication that the husband's duty to support encourages the wife's irre-
sponsibility is weakened in light of the sparse case law reflecting a
strict construction of the term "necessaries." If the creditor anticipates
the wife's avoidance of contractual duties, the creditor can require that
the wife contract to remain solely liable for her obligations. The public
policy against the husband-wife waiver of the duty of support can be
distinguished from the wife-creditor contract. Not only is the fear of
unequal bargaining power between spouses dissipated when the par-
ties are the woman and creditor, but her right to her husband's support
survives her contractual obligation to remain solely liable for her debts.
Also, states with equal rights amendments may have to substitute these
support laws with laws having equal applicability to both the male and
female."
In many states, if the pledging of the husband's credit is being
abused, he has the right to seek a court order prohibiting his wife from
obtaining credit on his account. The injunction may be rescinded if he
fails to provide her with "reasonable necessities;" however, he can close
his credit accounts, and, although she has a criminal action for nonsup-
port, she has no action in tort or contract for nonsupport. The married
woman's dilemma intensifies when she encounters the institutional
practice of filing the credit account in the husband's name regardless
of who pays the bills.65
Eleven states statutorily limit the liability of a married woman. 66
If the credit extended is greater than the statutory amount the creditor
fears subsequent debt disclaimer and demands an alternative source of
64. Hearings before the Subcomm. on Consumer Affairs of the House Comm. on Bank-
ing and Currency, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973) [hereinafter cited as Banking and Currency]
(testimony of M. Gates and N. Polikoff, Center for Women Policy Studies).
65. Hoffmann, supra note 63, at 138.
66. N.Y. Times, March 25, 1973, at 35, col. 4.
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repayment. Additionally, state law often stipulates the maximum
amount of money a licensee can loan to a consumer, with the husband
and wife regarded as one consumer.
Legal distinctions existing with respect to property ownership and
control are magnified in community property states. A precept of com-
munity property state laws is that the husband has the powers of ad-
ministration and control of the community assets. In all community
property states except Louisiana, the wife has sole management and
control of the community property representing her income until it is
commingled with other community property under the husband's
management and control. 67 Subject to certain procedural rules, the
husband's power to dispose of the community property is coterminous
with those powers exercisable over his own separate property. Also,
the community property can be exhausted to satisfy his debts and obli-
gations before his separate property for no priority of liabilities is
legislatively assessed against the separate assets. Unless the wife's debts
are "necessaries" or are secured by a pledge or mortgage of the husband,
they can rarely be enforced against the community property, even if
incurred for the benefit of the community.68
Legal justification for creditor's practices are found in agency law
and judicial construction of community property statutes. The most
prevalent procedure requires that a married woman apply for credit in
her husband's name. It is supported by a rationale that if the husband
entrusts money or credit cards to his wife, he has empowered her to
act as his agent. When the wife has the apparent authority to act for
her husband, her contracts are binding on him as to third parties. The
creditors can reach the community property to satisfy her debts based
upon the theory of implied consent by the husband.
Judicial construction of community property statutes has denied the
wife access to her portion of the community property.69 Even though
the wife has a present interest in the community property, her portion
has not vested to such degree as to permit it to be subject to her debts.
67. Arizona, California, Idaho, Louisiana, Nevada, New Mexico, Texas and Washington
are community property states. California, Louisiana, New Mexico and Nevada have not
provided for joint management of the community property and sole control over each
spouse's separate property as the remaining four states have. See Brown, The Discredited
American Woman: Sex Discrimination in Consumer Credit, 6 U. CALIF.-DAvIs L. REV.
61, 70-74 (1973); Carruth, Management and Control of Community Property: Sex Discrim-
ination in California Law, 6 U. CALF.-DAvis L. Ry. 383, 386-88 (1973).
68. Id.
69. Grolemund v. Cafferata, 17 Cal. 2d 679, 111 P.2d 641 (1948).
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The creditor would have no recourse if payments should cease from a
wife without separate non-commingled property.
The credit problem can be viewed as the product of outdated pre-
sumptions of pregnancy and job continuity and antiquated and mis-
understood laws pointing to the inferior legal status of women.70
Creativity and perseverence are the basic ingredients of a solution that
eliminates the discrimination practiced by private, state and federal
lenders and insurers.
II. THE REMEDY
Sex or marital status discrimination in credit transactions can be
remedied through administrative controls, judicial mandate, enforce-
able legislation and self help approaches.
A. Administrative Controls
Administrative agencies can regulate sex and marital status discrimi-
nation as to transactions involving institutions under their jurisdiction.
The absence of rule making authority and effective enforcement
machinery handicaps the remedial quality of administrative action.
In December, 1973, guidelines requiring that every applicant be
given an equal opportunity to obtain a loan were promulgated 7 by
the Federal Home Loan Bank Board72 (FHLBB) which supervises the
commercial thrift 3 and savings74 associations. The types of proscribed
practices include underwriting decisions that do not consider credit
history and reasonably forseeable economic prospects, but arbitrarily
differentiate loan applicants on the basis of assumptions as to the credit
70. A tradition infused into the property laws is the assumption of the husband's
surname upon marriage. A married woman who submits her maiden name on her credit
application may obtain credit based upon her own credit worth, but may also be in viola-
tion of a state law requiring her to use the married name. See Forbush v. Wallace, 341 F.
Supp. 217 (M.D. Ala. 1971), af'd, 405 U.S. 970 (1972), where a state law requiring a married
woman to use her husband's surname on the driver's license application was upheld.
71. 38 Fed. Reg. 34653 (1973).
72. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1437-40 (1970). The members of the FHLBB comprise the Board of
trustees of the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation, id. §§ 1724-30, which
insures up to $20,000 individual accounts in federal savings and loan associations and
eligible state-chartered thrift institutions.
73. Any building and loan association, insurance company or saving bank complying
with the Board's financial requirements qualifies as a member or nonmember borrower
of the Federal Home Loan Bank System.
74. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1461-68 (1970). Federal savings and loan associations in the Federal
Savings and Loan System are automatically members of the Federal Home Loan Bank
System.
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worth of each sex; the old and the young; or married, single, widowed,
separated or divorced individuals.7 5 Supplementary income of the
working wife is to be considered if such income can reasonably be ex-
pected to continue through the early period of the mortgage risk.78 The
use of lending standards having no economic basis and causing dis-
criminatory effects violates the law even in the absence of intent to dis-
criminate. 77
These guidelines are the most definitive adminstrative outline of
proscribed discriminatory practices. Their specificity fills the interpre-
tive gap left by the vague administrative promulgations of other
agencies. Enforcement of these regulations will yield equal credit op-
portunities that the regulations were designed to provide.
Other federal regulatory bodies include the Federal Reserve Board78
(FRB), the Comptroller of the Currency, 79 the Federal Deposit Insur-
ance Corporation8 0 (FDIC) the FHA and VA, and the Federal Trade
Commission s (FTC). The FRB regulates all national banks and quali-
fied state chartered banks whereas the Comptroller of the Currency
regulates commercial banks chartered under the National Banking Act
of 1863.82 A congressional proposal is to vest the FRB with rule making
powers to promulgate 'regulations the discriminatory practices of the
mortgage financiers.88  Neither agency has exercised its regulatory
powers with respect to this problem.
Proposed FDIC regulations8 4 encompass residential lending and
banking practices used by FDIC insured banks and are designed to
implement the provisions of the federal fair housing law.8 5 Proponents
of the proposed regulations reason that nondiscrimination is the under-
75. Reg. § 531.8(c)(1), 38 Fed. Reg. 34653 (1973).
76. Id. § 531.8(c)(3).
77. Id. § 531.8(b).
78. 12 U.S.C. §§ 221-522 (1970). Through its Board of Governors, a seven-member board
appointed by the president, the supply of money and credit in the United States is con-
trolled.
79. Id. §§ 1-14.
80. Id. §§ 1811-31. The FDIC insures the savings of depositors of member banks up
to a maximum of $20,000. All members of the Federal Reserve System are required to
be FDIC insured. The FDIC regulates state chartered commercial banks and mutual savings
banks which are not members of the Federal Reserve System.
81. 15 U.S.C. §§.41-77 (1970).
82. 12 U.S.C. §§ 21-215 (1970).
83. Banking & Currency, supra note 64 (testimony of P. Massey, Women's Equity Action
League).
84. Proposed Regs. §§ 338.1 to .8, 37 Fed. Reg. 19385 (1972). Section 338 would prohibit
8,000 of the 14,000 state chartered commercial banks and 326 of the 490 mutual savings
banks from discriminating in residential lending transactions. Savings and loan associations
are not included.
85. Civil Rights Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. § 3601 (1970).
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lying principle of this fair housing law and the FDIC proposed regula-
tions and the fair housing goal is unachievable without a similar
proscription of sex discrimination."8 Rule making authority is found
in the FDIC's specific and incidental powers to insure sound banking
practices.87 Advocates of the regulations argue that not only is sex and
marital status discrimination an unsound banking practice but a man-
agement unresponsive to the changing role of a woman in her labor,
financial and social community, would be less likely to exercise sound
business judgment in anticipating economic changes. The FDIC has
not acted on these proposed rules, which, if passed, would have a sig-
nificant impact on current banking practices.
Since the FHA and VA play an important role in mortgage financing,
enforcement of these agencies' changed policies and additional, more
specific guidelines could effectively control the current mortgage lend-
ing practices.
The FTC could provide administrative relief for the individual
against private lenders and credit card companies.88 The cease and
desist order is the FTC's weapon to prohibit unfair methods of com-
petition in commerce and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in com-
merce.89 Sex and marital status discrimination can be categorized as
unfair methods of competition in the market place of credit. Credit
point scoring systems which are weighted in the male applicant's behalf
can be classified as deceptive trade practices. The woman is deceived
into the belief that she receives equal credit appraisal; however, her
male counterpart's score is weighted by irrelevant credit factors, such
as a telephone listing, customarily in the husband's name. The FTC
is a viable source of relief for the consumer it is authorized to protect.
Agencies such as the FHLBB, the FRB, the Comptroller of Cur-
rency, the FDIC, the FHA and VA, and the FTC can provide admini-
86. Hearings on Fair Housing Lending Practices Before the FDIC, 92d Cong., 2d Sess.
(1972)..
87. 12 U.S.C. § 1811 (1970). The power to determine whether a nonmember bank is
insurable is in id. § 1816. Id. § 1828 outlines the power to grant requests to establish
branch offices or retire capital stock. Id. § 1818 vests discretion to terminate an insured's
status. Two factors to be weighed in each of the categories are: (a) the general character
and management of the bank; and (b) the convenience and needs of the community to be
served by the banks. Coupled with this claimed authority is the general federal policy to
eliminate sex discrimination. Noteworthy is the FCC's use of its licensing powers in the
Washington, D.C. area to prohibit discrimination against women in employment by radio
and television stations.
88. Banks are exempted from the jurisdiction of the FTC. Id. § 45(a)(6).
89. Id. § 45(b).
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strative remedies; however, until the regulations are earnestly enforced,
the individual must seek relief in other arenas.
B. Judicial Mandates
The judiciary is a remedial forum for private and class action liti-
gants who allege that the discriminatory credit practices violate existing
statutory or constitutional rights.
1. Statutory Remedies
A federal civil remedy against private acts of discrimination may
be provided by the Public Accommodations Act. 90 The Act provides the
individual with a cause of action for injunctive relief against the denial
or coercive interference with his or her rights to "... . goods, services...
privileges, advantages ... of any place of public accommodation .... ,
91
A private establishment whose facilities are available to the. public
is within the scope of the Act.92 Provided its operations affect interstate
commerce, a private bank open to the public is arguably a public ac-
commodation within the meaning of the Act.
Although the Act proscribes racial discrimination, it does not speak
of sex or marital status classifications. A woman would be without the
protected class unless it can be persuasively maintained that the
minority woman sustains the greatest injury, for she is often the sole
support of the family, yet denied head of household status in financial
transactions.93 Even though the link to race may be established, relief
may be limited to the minority woman.
Unless the bank is defined as a public accommodation and sex is de-
nominated as part of the protected class, private acts of credit discrimi-
nation may be without the purview of the Public Accommodations Act.
2. Constitutional Remedies
A constitutional remedy based upon a construction of the fourteenth
amendment's equal protection clause, and fifth amendment's due pro-
90. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a to a(6) (1970).
91. Id. § 2000a(a).
92. Id.
93. Even if sex classifications are made a part of the protected class, the section could
be interpreted to require discriminatory intent on the part of the violator rather than a
discriminatory effect. Since race is a suspect classification, a compelling state interest is
required before the discriminatory effect would be upheld. See Loving v. Virginia, 388
U.S. 1 (1967). Distinctions based upon sex have been struck down for lack of a rational
basis for them. See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 US. 677 (1973); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S.
71 (1971). Query whether the discriminatory effect of the existing credit practices is suffi-
dent to bring women within the protected class of the Public Accommodation Act.
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cess clause and the equal rights amendment is dependent upon which
standard of review is used and whether the concept of state action em-
braces banking practices.
Although the Supreme Court has held that the equal protection
clause is applicable to discrimination on the basis of sex 4 it declined to
employ a strict standard of review in a sex discrimination case.95
Mandatory licensure of the lending institution by a state or federal
agency may involve the government so that the institution's discrimi-
natory practices constitute state action. When banks are policed by
state and federal regulatory bodies for compliance with their charters,
yet permitted to continue their discriminatory policies, the govern-
mental inaction may be a denial of equal rights under the law partic-
ularly because the public domain is concerned.98
The existing discriminatory credit practices would probably be un-
constitutional under the equal rights amendment, 97 provided state ac-
tion is shown. It fails as a present solution for not all of the 38 states
required for ratification have endorsed it and a two year period must
lapse before its effective date.
Enforcement of statutory98 and constitutional prohibitions is a costly,
complex and piecemeal solution. Enforcement of well drafted legisla-
tion would deal one swift blow to the arbitrary credit practices.
C. Enforceable Legislation
The most effective remedy is enforcement of corrective legislation.
Discrimination on the basis of sex or marital status is not statutorily
prohibited by the civil rights laws protecting beneficiaries of federally
assisted programs,99 or borrowers of housing financiers.100 Proposed
legislation is awaiting final congressional affirmation; however, federal
credit legislation prompts unresolved issues.
Several major bills0 introduced in the 93rd Congress would amend
94. Reed v. Reed, 404 US. 71 (1971).
95. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 US. 677 (1973).
96. See generally Moose Lodge v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 180 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
97. HJR, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. § 835 (1972).
98. An antitrust action alleging a group boycott by the banks against women due to
their practices of discrimination on the basis of sex or marital status is an alternative
private remedy. An in-depth analysis of the action is beyond the scope of this comment.
99. 42 U.S.C. §§ 20OOd-d4 (1970).
100. Civil Rights Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (1970).
101. S. 2101, 93d Cong., Ist Sess. (1973); H.R. 9538, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973). Creditors
or card issuers are prohibited from discriminating on account of sex or marital status.
The prohibition applies to all credit transactions including credit approval, continuation
885
Duquesne Law Review
the Truth in Lending Act102 by prohibiting sex or marital status dis-
crimination in the consumer credit transaction. Institutions within the
jurisdiction of the FRB, FDIC, FHLBB and federally chartered credit
unions will be regulated by their respective licensing agencies whereas
all creditors not otherwise covered are regulated by the FTC. The
amendments also provide for private enforcement, the civil liability
provisions including penalties from $100-10,000 for individual actions
and the lesser of $100,000 or 1 per cent of the net worth of the company
for corporate discriminatory action.103
Other bills propose amendments to the National Housing ActI' 4
and a credit act prohibiting discrimination ofn account of sex or marital
status by any creditor or credit card issuer against any individual.10° A
credit legislation moratorium has been called until a bill encompassing
all phases of the credit transaction and addressing significant problems
with federal legislation is drafted. 06
A recurrent issue is whether a federal credit act will preempt exist-
ing property and domestic relations laws. The doctrine of preemption
requires that the federal law controls when the federal and state laws
are in conflict. To the extent that the state property and domestic
relations laws mandate sex and marital status discrimination a conflict
would exist. These conflicts are substantially resolved by the equal
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment and, perhaps, the
equal rights amendment so that the apparent conflict is de minimus.107
The creditor can obey both the commands of federal and state statutes.
or denial or establishment of the credit terms. The provisions also apply to certain trans-
actions exempt under section 1603 of the Consumer Credit Protection Act, 15 U:S.C.
§§ 1601-81 (1970), such as transactions in securities or commodities by a broker-dealer
registered under the Securities and Exchange Commission, credit transactions involving
business purposes, transactions other than real property which require financing in excess
of $25,000, and transactions under public utility tariffs, S. Rep. No. 262, 93d Cong., Ist Sess.
27 (1973).
102. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-81 (1970).
103. The proposed act would incorporate the civil liability provisions of section 1640
of the Consumer Credit Protection Act. Actual damages, court costs .and reasonable attor-
ney fees are recoverable. Additional damages for the individual plaintiff include damages
that are twice the amount of the illegal charge and not less than $100 nor more than $1000.
The aggregate limitation on a creditor's class action liability can not exceed $100,000 or
I per cent of the creditor's net worth. This limitation was deemed sufficient to deter po-
tential violations, achieve widespread compliance and protect legitimate businesses from
unwarranted claims in frivolous lawsuits. S. 2101, 93d Cong., Ist Sess. 15-37 (1973). To
minimize the possibility of frivolous lawsuits, a requirement of posting bond is a more
flexible approach than a maximum damage limit.
104. H.R. 8393, 93d Cong., Ist Sess. 525 (1973); H.R. 8879, 93d Cong., Ist Sess. (1973).
105. H.R. 8246, 93d Cong., Ist Sess. (1973).
106. 120 CONG. Rxc. E. 209-11 (daily ed. Jan. 28, 1974) (remarks of Congresswoman
Lenore Sullivan).
107. Economic Problems, supra note 12, at 456.
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A more serious question arises as to compliance with state property
rights vesting in the individual as a result of inchoate rights, inheri-
tance and community property laws. Since state law often requires
the spouse's signature, the creditor must know the individual's
marital status. If the creditor is unaware of the prospective mortgagee's
marital status he may be precluded from levying upon an interest
mortgaged without the legal formality of a spouse's signature. 08 In
other states, the spouse's inchoate dower rights are superior to the
rights of the mortgagee. 109 The apparent conflict between state law and
the proposed federal law is reconciled when the fact of marital status
is limited to the obtaining of joint signatures, a procedural protection
for the spouses, and does not implicate the credit worth of the married
woman.110
In those circumstances where substantial federal state issues are
presented, the FRB can be authorized to promulgate regulations har-
monizing congressional intent with those property laws within the
proper jurisdiction of the states.' In community property states where
the assets of the community are in the control of the husband, the
creditor Would not be in violation of the federal law if the married
woman is denied credit in her own name. The married woman is not
credit worthy for she lacks legal capacity to repay her debts. 112
Ideally, legislation could expand the consumer protection act into
a federal code of good credit practice in all areas of credit." 8 Efficient
and regular enforcement will substantially eliminate discrimination
on the basis of sex and marital status.
D. Self Help Remedies
Self help remedies are available to curb the discrimination in con-
nection with credit applications and credit records. To establish a good
108. A creditor of either spouse can not levy on that spouse's interest in property held
in tenancy by the entireties because neither spouse can voluntarily dispose of his or her
interest without the consent of the other. Consequently, the creditor requires both signa-
tures before accepting the property as security. This form of ownership is still used in
Alaska, Arkansas, Delaware, Florida, Indiana, Kentucky, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michi-
gan, Missouri, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania,
Rhode Island, Tennessee, Vermont, Virginia, Wisconsin and Wyoming. See Banking and
Currency, supra note 64.
109. When a husband alone executes a mortgage inchoate dower is superior to the
rights of the mortgagee, whether he is a conveyor or a creditor of the husband. Dower
rights to estates for life exist in Alabama, Arkansas, Alaska, Delaware, Georgia, Hawaii,
Kentucky, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Jersey, Ohio, Oregon, Rhode Island, Tennessee,
Virginia, West Virginia and Wisconsin. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. See S. Rep. No. 262, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 20 (1973).
113. See 120 CONG. REc. E. 211 (daily ed. Jan. 28, 1974).
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credit record, the single woman may need a parent or guardian guaran-
tor for the first credit transaction. A record of employment stability,
dealings with reputable firms and checking and savings accounts is an
indication that the applicant is a good money manager.
If a credit identity has been established while single, then upon
marriage she need not notify her creditors of a change in marital status
if she retains her maiden name. If she assumes her husband's surname,
the married woman should insist upon retaining her first name so that
a credit identity may be preserved. The local credit bureau should be
notified that the woman desires a file under her own name, indepen-
dent of her husband's file, so as to preserve her individual credit status.
If the bureau refuses, she can inform it that under the Consumer Credit
Protection Act" 4 the bureau is required to maintain a consumer credit
report on each individual consumer. Because she is considered an in-
dividual, credit is extended to her on the basis of her income," 5 and
she can insist on a separate file in her own name.
The couple can police retail stores or banks which sponsor credit
cards. If both the husband and wife are credit worthy individuals but
two credit cards are issued in the husband's name, either the institution
has not passed on the wife's application or has refused to grant the card
in the woman's name on account of her marital status. If the institu-
tion has denied passing on the wife's application the issuance of two
cards to one person constitutes a violation of the Consumer Credit Pro-
tection Act. 116 When the institution admits passing on the wife's
application, yet denies her a credit card in her name, the inference is
discrimination because of the fact of marital status.
The Consumer Credit Protection Act also provides that when credit
has been denied, the consumer has the right to know the reason for the
denial or which credit bureau's report was the basis of the denial. The
consumer has the right to see the file, delete erroneous information and
to complete an incomplete file. 117
The separated but not divorced woman should pay her bills during
this separation period even though additional credit has been sus-
pended. Delay in payment will impair future credit granting.1 8
114. 15 US.C. §§ 1601-81 (1970).
115. Id. § 1681.
116. Id.
117. Id. §§ 1681g-j.
118. See note 16 supra.
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Self help remedies include deliberate planning and preparation of
the women's individual credit record, and persistent insistence upon
her federal credit disclosure rights.
III. CONCLUSION
The process of insuring equal credit opportunities for all individuals
commences with an examination of economic justifications of each
credit risk factor. The traditional credit risk factors have been an in-
dividual's character, capacity and collateral measured within the frame
of reference of the particular creditor's credit risk experiences. More
contemporary evaluators, though, identify the borrower characteristics
in relation to past credit collection difficulties and assess the status of
these characteristics in the present credit structure. In the past, sex
and/or marital status have been assumed to be important factors in
the credit risk decision. Yet, when these factors are analyzed in the
present credit structure, their value as a predictor of prospective credit
risk is statistically insignificant.
The credit discrimination is apparent in the credit card and mort-
gage financing transactions. When a woman applies for a credit card,
she often must supply higher credentials than her male counterpart.
Upon a change of marital status, she loses her prior credit worth status
and is foreclosed from creating a good record because her credit data
merges with her husband's when the credit bureau files it under the
family unit's, the husband's name. These credit practices are not war-
ranted because economic assumptions concerning credit worth of
women are faulty. Furthermore, the justification of administrative effi-
ciency breaks down in light of the Consumer Credit Protection Act.
The Act poses a serious question as to the legality of the credit bureau's
practice of filing the credit information of the husband and wife, who
are two individual consumers, under one consumer's name.
In the mortgage financing transaction, a working wife's income is
arbitrarily discounted. Creditors place great importance on the expense
to income ratio; consequently, when and if her income terminates, the
probability of default is directly proportional to the increased expense
to income ratio. Creditors assume that a woman will marry she will
have uncontrolled pregnancy, and she will permanently retire from the
work force. Not only have these assumptions been statistically crum-
bled, but the value of the expense to income ratio as a credit risk pre-
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dictor is de minimus. When the loss of potential customers is added to
the loss of significant purchasers of mortgages in the secondary mort-
gage market, the result is that the prevalent credit practices are eco-
nomic negatives.
The process of insuring equal credit opportunities for all continues
with a precise analysis of the legal status of women in property law.
When the common law doctrine of "necessaries" is viewed within the
scope of family expense statutes, when the community property con-
cepts of ownership and control are seen within the frame of changing
social policy, and when legal technicalities are construed in light of the
purpose behind t}Ie formalities, the social justifications for discrimi-
nation because of the fact of sex and/or marital status evaporate.
Once the problem is defined, the process of insuring equal credit
opportunity for all focuses upon appropriate remedies. Administrative
relief is a realistic alternative, provided there is continuous and effec-
tive enforcement of guidelines or contract warranties by the appro-
priate regulatory agency. Both statutory and constitutional remedies
are proposed; however, the handicap of seeking relief in the judicial
forum is that it is both costly and piecemeal. Enforcement of well
drafted legislation evolves as the most practical and effective insurance
of equal credit opportunity for all. In the interim, self help remedies
are available not only to educate the creditor but to insist upon the
creditor's compliance with the law.
The problem has been defined, remedies have been proposed and
desirable results are forecasted. To a certain degree, all discrimination
can be erased in the eyes of the law by any of the suggested remedial
approaches. The real challenge to society is the conviction that one's
physical characteristics is of no consequence in assessing credit worth.
MAUREEN ELLEN LALLY
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